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What began as a music-only streaming platform evolved into a broader audio platform that included podcasts and audiobooks. Now, Spotify is venturing into video — in both snippets and long-form content, although the latter is only in an experimental phase.
During Tuesday’s Q2 earnings call, CEO Daniel Ek and interim CFO Ben Kung repeatedly referred to “the Spotify Machine” when explaining the company’s expansion beyond music. As Ek explained, the term means the company “isn’t just a sort of one-trick pony anymore, but it’s actually multiple verticals working together” to create more choice for consumers and drive more engagement.
“Because you may come for the music and stay for the audiobooks,” Ek said. “Some customers may come for the podcast and stay for the audiobooks.”
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The term makes sense: Spotify is an increasingly complex product with multiple moving parts, numerous audio and video formats, and a variety of paid tiers. Each new component to the machine is meant to make the company more valuable as a whole. Similarly, concert promoter and ticketing company Live Nation uses the term “flywheel” to describe how its various products and business segments provide momentum for the larger entity. But “the machine” has a better ring to it.
The machine is integral to becoming a sustainable, profitable company. As Spotify detailed in its 2022 investor day presentation, branching out from music will help improve its gross margins and become the profitable company it has long aspired to be. Music margins are roughly 30% of revenue — the remaining 70% goes to rights holders — and will top out at 35%, the company has said. At that 2022 presentation, Spotify said podcast margins can reach 40-50% gross margin and overall gross margin can get to 40% (gross margin rose to 27.6% in Q1 from 25.2% a year earlier).
The machine helps increase engagement. Spotify is more valuable if people spend more time using it. When engagement increases, churn decreases, which in turn reduces the expense involved in bringing those lapsed customers back. When engagement increases, free users are more likely to become paid subscribers. The last thing a streaming service wants is an infrequent customer who doesn’t enjoy the features or delve deep into its content. Audiobooks are a good example of keeping people hooked: Ek said that in the markets where audiobooks are available, 25% of users are listening to them. What’s more, in the first two weeks a Spotify user listens to audiobooks, Spotify sees “over two and a half hours of incremental usage on the audiobook side,” he said.
The machine gives users greater freedom of choice. Ek confirmed Spotify will have an audiobook-only subscription tier along with a music-only tier; the standard subscription tier offers both music and audiobooks. Over the years, Spotify has given consumers multiple options to choose from: an individual plan, a two-person plan called Duo, a multi-user family plan, and, in certain markets, the ability to purchase one day at a time. Spotify wants to provide “as much flexibility as possible in this next stage of Spotify” to convert more users to paid subscribers, Ek explained.
The machine is built to maximize value. Ek and Kung frequently mentioned a particular internal metric, a value-to-price ratio, that Spotify uses as a North Star these days. By adding podcasts, audiobooks and education, as well as features such as Wrapped — Spotify’s personalized year-end recap — Spotify delivers more value than it provided when it was a simpler, music-only service. Ek singled out the videos that Spotify has added in “11 or 12” markets and built anticipation for video clips that will allow artists to tell stories about their new releases. Such videos are one way Spotify is “focused on winning discovery” to make the platform a better listening experience, Ek said. Spotify’s recent foray into educational video courses in the U.K. is another stab at adding value.
The machine ultimately gives Spotify the ability to raise prices. When Spotify adds products and features, EK explained, it increases its value-to-price ratio. That, in turn, allows it to occasionally raise prices to capture the value it created. “The way you should think about this as investors is the better we can improve the product, the more people engage with our product, and the more value we ultimately create,” Ek said. “And the more value we create, the more ability we will have to then capture some of that value by price increases.” After more than a decade of value creation and stagnant prices, Spotify raised rates in July 2023. In April, it again hiked rates in select markets — including the United Kingdom and Australia — and is expected to expand those increases to additional markets.
The machine also requires a feat of engineering. “It’s a fairly complex machine,” Kung said, because Spotify has both variable-cost models, such as revenue sharing and per-hour royalties, and fixed-cost models — some in-house and licensed podcast content, perhaps. Ek added that “the machine takes care of all the complexity on the back end to deal with what was historically a very difficult problem to solve, which is multiple business models in one consumer experience.” Spotify’s engineering challenge is incorporating additional verticals into a seamless user experience without getting clunky — a criticism often launched at iTunes, which started as a music store and added videos, books, apps, podcasts and iTunes U, a place for educational materials. “Simplicity is hard,” a former Apple product designer once wrote. “Very hard. But when you get it, it’s beautiful.”
The machine might take some getting used to. As Spotify branches out to non-music verticals, it has stakeholders other than the music rights holders, artists and songwriters it has served for more than a decade. Now, Spotify also supports podcasters, authors and — although in the early stages — educators. That has already created some tension between music publishers and Spotify following news that Spotify considers its music-audiobook subscription offering to be a bundle under the Phonorecords IV mechanical rate structure in the United States. Subscription bundles allow Spotify to pay a slightly lower royalty rate. But really, is anybody surprised that the machine is trying to save a little money?
As growth slows in large, developed markets, music companies are looking elsewhere for opportunities. Increasingly, companies are targeting superfans, the most fervent and high-spending of music consumers, to provide those revenue gains.
The Pareto Principle says that roughly 20% of customers provide 80% of a company’s revenue. Whatever the breakdown, music companies are expecting more from a small subset of big spenders. Concert promoter Live Nation wants premium offerings such as VIP boxes to increase to 30% to 35% of its amphitheater business from the current 9%, president/CEO Michael Rapino told investors during the company’s Feb. 22 earnings call. Earlier this year, the heads of Universal Music Group and Warner Music Group revealed their desire to offer new types of services and products for the most fervent of music fans.
Coming out of the pandemic, people — especially younger consumers — spent money “as a way to make up for lost time” and, later, to cope with stress, Intuit Credit Karma, a financial management platform, explained. Consulting firm McKinsey & Company calls this behavior “selective splurging.” According to a November 2023 global survey by McKinsey, 20% of all consumers planned to splurge on out-of-home entertainment such as concerts — less than restaurants (38%), apparel (34%) and travel (28%).
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More than two in five Gen Z consumers (42%) spent more on live concerts than before the pandemic, according to a September 2023 survey by Qualtrics on behalf of Intuit Credit Karma. That was well above Millennials (34%), Gen X (19%) and Baby Boomers (11%). Last year, music fans paid high prices to see the two biggest cultural events: tours by Taylor Swift and Beyonce. Fittingly, Swift’s The Eras Tour was sponsored by Capital One, and some fans signed up for their first credit card as a result.
A couple of years after pandemic restrictions ended, though, consumers have a spending hangover and seem less willing to reach deeper into their pockets. Ample data suggest that consumers are increasingly stressed from high prices — U.S. inflation rose to 3.5% in March from 3.2% in February — and the ending of pandemic-era forbearances that allowed people to put off payments on their mortgages and student loans.
Splurging has given way to focusing on the basics. Consumers intend to spend more than usual on essentials such as gasoline, groceries, produce and pet food, as well as health and fitness, in the next three months, according to a McKinsey survey in February. In contrast, consumers intend to spend less on discretionary items: entertainment, domestic flights, hotel and resort stays, home improvement and alcoholic beverages. Luxuries such as jewelry, furniture and home decorations have the biggest gap between spenders and savers.
Rising debt is one reason consumers are pulling back on spending. In the United States, the ratio of credit cards and auto loans becoming past due by 90 days or more exceeds pre-pandemic levels. Delinquency rates are especially bad for younger consumers who are most likely to spend money on concerts and entertainment. In the fourth quarter of 2023, the Gen Z delinquency transition rate — transitioning into delinquency — reached 11.86% compared to 8.53% in the fourth quarter of 2021, according to the New York Federal Reserve. Millennials’ delinquency transition rate rose to 9.56% from 6.53% two years earlier. Gen X and Baby Boomers’ delinquencies are also trending up but faring better (7.01% and 4.78%, respectively).
For many young consumers who have taken on debt, 2024 will be a year to pull back. A third of Millennials and Gen Z say they have a shopping addiction, according to a survey by Qualtrics for Intuit Credit Karma conducted in February and March of this year. About three-quarters of Millennials and Gen Z surveyed by Qualtrics say they plan to change how they spend money. A full 20% of them said 2024 will be a “no buy year,” a recent trend where people swear off spending except to replace items, and 56% said they will have a “low buy year,” meaning they will reduce shopping significantly.
Credit card debt is nothing new, though, and some experts believe consumers can take it in stride. Although credit card balances increased in 2023, consumers “largely still have the wherewithal to repay their existing obligations,” according to credit monitoring service Experian. In fact, the average FICO credit score improved to 715 in 2023 from 714 in 2022 despite the average credit card balance increasing 10%. In February, credit ratings agency Fitch revised its forecast for U.S. real (adjusted for inflation) consumer spending to 1.3% from 0.6%, largely on the belief that consumers will draw down savings throughout the year.
High-priced concert tickets and experiences might be out of the question, but superfan spending is also more mundane. Artists routinely put out new albums with multiple CD and vinyl LP variants knowing that their most hardcore fans consider them to be collectibles (and purchase them to help their favorite artists top the charts). Swift’s 2022 album Midnights had 20 different versions across all physical formats. Those album sales accounted for 1.14 million of the 1.58 million units sold in its first week of release. At $20 or $30 apiece, supporting a favorite artist doesn’t require going into debt.
Music isn’t a necessity like food and shelter, but it’s proved to be both recession-proof and pandemic-proof. Regardless of the rises and falls in consumer sentiment, inflation rates and unemployment trends, people will spend money on music. But the broader trends around consumer spending may mean that the growth the music business hopes to reap from those superfans may not be as lucrative, at least for now, as they may have hoped.
Accounting scandals may not get the public’s attention like a raid by Homeland Security, but questions about the quality of a publicly traded company’s books is a serious matter. This week, an internal report made public by Hipgnosis Songs Fund, the London-listed company that played a major role in turning music rights into a stable, attractive asset class, confirmed what some analysts and shareholders had long suspected.
At best, the 26-page report by Shot Tower Capital, the firm hired by the company’s board of directors in the wake of a shareholder revolt in October, details how the investment advisor, the Merck Mercuriadis-led Hipgnosis Song Management (HSM), made numerous missteps in accounting and financial projections of its vast music rights portfolio that includes music by Red Hot Chili Peppers, Shakira and Journey. At worst, the report suggests the investment advisor chose accounting standards that overstated revenue, inflated the portfolio’s valuation and — as the board previously stated — resulted in larger fees paid for managing the portfolio. In any case, information released Thursday presents an unflattering portrait of HSM and its internal operations.
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For its part, HSM considers some “aspects of the report…to be factually inaccurate and misleading,” the company said in a statement on Thursday (Mar. 28). HSM said it received the report the evening before its release and will respond to the board “in due course.”
To be clear, Shot Tower did not explicitly comment on the investment advisor’s intent in using certain accounting practices. The data-heavy report offers analysis, not speculation. But the report, part of the board of directors’ effort to regain shareholders’ trust, made clear that annual revenue was “materially” overstated and laid out numerous examples where the fund’s numbers didn’t reflect the reality behind its assets.
Take, for example, something called right to income (RTI), which are royalties that are paid to the buyer at the close of an acquisition. (If the acquisition’s effective date is prior to the closing date, royalties received by the seller after the effective date are credited to the buyer.) Normally, the amount of the RTI is deducted from the purchase price and is not included in annual revenue figures. However, Shot Tower found that some RTI revenue from Hipgnosis acquisitions was counted as annual revenues rather than an adjustment in the purchase price. As the board’s Mar. 18 update noted, including RTI revenue with annual revenue amounts to “double counting.” Misclassifying RTI “significantly” increased the fund’s income in 2021 and 2022, according to the report. In fiscal 2019 and fiscal 2020, zero and 5.3% of deals had RTI periods that extended for more than one year. In fiscal 2021 and 2022, those numbers jumped to 43.9% and 60.0%.
RTI also came into play with the proposed sale of a portion of the portfolio to Hipgnosis Songs Capital, a joint venture of HSM and investment firm Blackstone. The catalog was presented to shareholders as having a net purchase price of $424.7 million (including RTI revenue of $15.3 million). With pro-forma annual revenue (PFAR) of $24.1 million, HSM assigned a 17.6x multiple to the proposed sale. But Shot Tower believes the catalog’s multiple should have been 14.9x based on higher annual revenue of $28 million and believed the net sale price should have been $416.7 million. Shareholders voted against the proposed sale in October.
In fiscal 2022, the investment advisor changed how it accounted for accrued revenues. The fund is required to make estimates on revenue earned in the period, rather than recognize revenue when the royalties are collected. A new approach, called “usage accruals,” calculated accruals “based on expected usage” rather than when revenues “are paid to, and processed by, collection societies, publishers and administrators.” Shot Tower noted the adoption of usage accruals occurred “at a time when RTI revenue was declining and the Fund could no longer raise capital for continued acquisitions.” In other words, a lack of fresh funding halted acquisitions and reduced the amount of RTI revenue added to annual revenue. Without the change, Shot Tower believes the fund “would have breached its lender covenants” and fiscal 2022 revenue would have been $36 million lower.
Accrued revenue also caused problems with PFAR, a non-IFRS metric meant to show investors organic growth excluding accruals and RTI. But Shot Tower found PFAR did indeed include accrual estimates of income expected to be included in the period, which “presents a picture of organic growth that is higher than growth suggested by the statement data,” according to the report. As such, Shot Tower warned investors not to rely on PFAR as a metric.
More issues arose in Shot Tower’s due diligence investigations into how individual catalogs were valued. The entire portfolio, which stood at $2.8 billion on Mar. 31, 2023, is instead worth $1.95 billion, according to the report — a difference of some $850 million. Given the transparency into the fund’s accounting practices, however, shareholders were unfazed by the demotion. On Thursday, Hipgnosis Song Fund’s share price jumped 8.3% to 69 pence, its highest closing price since Jan. 31 and 30.4% above its low point in 2024, 52.9 pence, set on Mar. 4. Whether the share price will improve further could depend on how shareholders view the board’s reaction to this report.
The IFPI’s annual figure for global recorded music revenue, announced Thursday (Mar. 21) for 2023, is the gold standard for tracking the health of the music business. It’s the number most often cited in corporate reports, market research and media articles. It’s also a bit outdated.
Traditionally, record labels have sold and streamed music, secured synch licenses and collected performance and neighboring rights royalties. But a modern record label also collects expanded rights revenues — from multi-right, 360-degree recording contracts — by taking a share of artists’ income from merchandise, touring and branding, among other sources. Those expanded rights revenues aren’t part of the IFPI’s annual revenue tally, but MIDiA Research includes that — and more — in its annual estimate.
MIDiA’s more fulsome figure for global recorded music revenue in 2023 was $35.1 billion, nearly 23% higher than the IFPI’s $28.6 billion. According to MIDiA, which tells Billboard its estimate came from publicly available information and interviews, expanded rights revenue totaled $3.5 billion in 2023.
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Some expanded rights revenue is in plain sight. Universal Music Group, for example, took in 706 million euros ($764 million) of merchandising revenue from Bravado, its wholly owned merchandise company, in 2023. For other companies, expanded rights are harder to pin down. Warner Music Group had $744 million of artist services and expanded-rights revenue in 2023. WMG’s expanded rights includes merchandising, VIP ticketing, fan clubs, concert promotion and management, according to its latest quarterly report.
Neither global revenue figure is right or wrong; they’re just different. The IFPI’s revenue figures reflect how labels monetize the rights associated with master recordings through sales, streaming and licensing. MIDiA’s revenue figure acknowledges the role of record labels has expanded far beyond monetization of masters.
Even the term “expanded rights” is problematic because it suggests merchandise and branding isn’t central to a record label’s mission. That isn’t necessarily the case in 2024. Consider the wave of K-pop companies expanding globally out of South Korea. HYBE, home of boy band BTS, is a hybrid record label, talent agency and management company with a slow, painstaking artist development process and a business model that captures far more than recorded music sales. In 2023, 55% of HYBE’s revenue came from sources other than recorded music. Concerts accounted for roughly 16% of revenue, merchandise and licensing were 15%, and ads and appearances were 7%. In fact, MIDiA estimated that Korean labels — including SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, JYP Entertainment and Starship Entertainment — accounted for nearly 70% of non-major-label expanded rights revenue.
Another difference between the IFPI and MIDiA reports is the latter’s emphasis on the fast-growing independent artist community. Easy access to recording tools and distribution has gotten the everyday artist’s recordings on digital platforms around the world. MIDiA estimates there was $1.8 billion in “artist direct” revenue in 2023. Artist direct is a category of self-publishing, independent artists who use self-serve platforms like DistroKid and TuneCore, and MIDiA’s 2023 Creator Survey estimated there are 6.4 million artists in this segment. While 38% of these independent artists aspire to be full-time musicians, 36% do not expect to focus on music as a sole career. Deducting expanded rights and artist direct revenues from MIDiA’s $35.1 billion estimate narrows the difference between that and the IFPI’s $28.6 million figure.
Another difference between the two reports stems from MIDiA’s inclusion of revenue from production libraries in its synch revenue figure. Production music — which spans everything from beat marketplace BeatStars to online library Epidemic Sound — often exists outside of the record label system that traditionally develops and markets artists. Unlike artist-oriented music, production music is often nameless and faceless content that advertisers and other content creators license for its specific sound and style rather than artist name recognition. Lacking star power is the point, however: Production music libraries are increasingly popular amongst content creators in need of affordable background music.
Broader measurements will be crucial for tracking the recorded music business of the future. Record labels will pursue “superfans” through products and services that may not produce typical sales and streams. Artificial intelligence will create new licensing opportunities. Greater adoption of the K-pop model will change what it means to be a record label. When that happens broadly, $28.6 billion of annual revenue will be a starting point. Judging by MiDIA’s 2023 report, it already is.
In a New Year letter to staff in January, Warner Music Group CEO Robert Kyncl said the company needed to offer better services to the “middle class of artists,” an area being feverishly pursued by his major-label competitors, as well as a handful of independent distribution companies.
This week, WMG revealed it is interested in acquiring French company Believe, which owns a large label services business, digital distributor TuneCore, publishing administration service Sentric and a stable of record labels including Naïve, Nuclear Blast and Groove Attack. WMG said it is willing to pay “at least” 17 euros ($18.60) per share, a premium to the 15 euros ($16.41) per share offered by a consortium led by Believe CEO Denis Ladegaillerie and investment funds EQT and TCV. WMG’s bid values Believe at roughly 1.65 billion euros ($1.8 billion).
WMG’s interest in Believe doesn’t come as a surprise. The middle class of artists Kyncl referenced wants alternatives to traditional recording and publishing deals — and WMG needs the tools to give those artists what they want.
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While WMG can likely bring greater value to Believe’s assets as well, a Believe deal “solves a real stack problem for [WMG],” says Matt Pincus, founder and CEO of MUSIC, a venture with investment bank Liontree. A full “stack” — a tech term that refers to all the technologies and skills required for a project — would allow WMG to serve a more complete range of artists. Presently, WMG’s product offering is missing a distributor for self-published artists, says Pincus, that provides a level of artist services between a do-it-yourself distribution deal and a record label contract. That would augment WMG’s ADA, which distributes indie labels, and create a funnel to bring rising artists into WMG’s system.
Kyncl need only look at how his competitors are serving middle-class artists. Following the rise of iTunes, some independent distributors were eventually acquired by other major labels that wanted to distribute music on a greater scale. Sony Music has The Orchard, a digital distributor acquired in 2015, and AWAL, an artist-development company acquired from Kobalt in 2022. Universal Music Group acquired digital distributor Ingrooves in 2019 and folded it into its artist- and label-services division, Virgin Music Group in 2022. TuneCore, founded in 2006 to allow artists to access a new era of digital stores and services, was acquired by Believe in 2015.
The majors’ emphasis on label services is an acknowledgement that today’s marketplace is a mix of traditional artist deals, do-it-yourself independent artists and everything in-between — distribution deals, joint ventures, licensing deals, profit-sharing arrangements and releases from independent artists backed by a major’s label services provider. Budding superstars often want independence but need the majors’ global infrastructure and expertise. “What really makes a difference in this world is to do what [CEO] Brad [Navin] and the Orchard did with the Bad Bunny record [Un Verano Sin Ti],” says Pincus. “They really helped break that record worldwide.”
Believe would also provide WMG a publishing solution for those same independent artists. “When you consider that Believe also acquired Sentric publishing, this brings together master and publishing for many of these indie artists,” says Vickie Nauman of advisory firm CrossBorderWorks. “That also opens up opportunities for new synch licensing models that otherwise fragmented rights do not allow.”
Geography is another aspect of Believe’s business that could be attractive to WMG. Although the majority of Believe’s revenue comes from Europe, it has employees in more than 50 countries and has a presence in fast-growing markets such as Indian — where it invested in two record labels, Venus and Think Music — and Indonesia. Approximately 27% of Believe’s total revenue in the first nine months of 2023 came from Asia-Pacific and Africa, a 17.4% increase from the prior-year period.
Developing markets have great potential for a couple reasons, Kyncl explained Wednesday at the Morgan Stanley Technology, Media and Telecom 2024 conference. In the Middle East, for example, markets that have young populations, an underdeveloped subscription market and lack collection societies “will see quite a lot of value appreciation.” Developing markets are increasingly becoming music exporters, and Kyncl believes that provides WMG with an arbitrage opportunity. “Let’s say if you have Indonesian content that’s traveling to America,” he said. “It’s a smart place to put money because it’s [going] from a low ARPU country to high ARPU streams [in a developed market].”
An acquisition is hardly a done deal, though. To date, WMG has only expressed an interest in Believe. WMG is playing catch-up, too: The consortium attempting to take Believe private has lined up blocks representing nearly 72% of share capital — enough to “prevent a competing bidder from acquiring control,” according to Believe’s ad-hoc committee — although WMG’s higher bid could change that. An acquisition would require regulatory approval, too, and there is likely to be pushback from music companies and trade associations such as the UK-based Association of Independent Music against further industry consolidation.
But, setting aside the potential roadblocks, WMG would be a good fit for Believe. Sony Music and UMG are both larger than WMG, already have Believe-like companies and would thus face more regulatory scrutiny. The 1.65 billion-euros ($1.8 billion) price tag is in what astronomers call the “Goldilocks zone” for habitable planets’ distance to their suns: It’s too expensive for many independent companies but affordable enough for WMG.
The breakdown in licensing talks between Universal Music Group (UMG) and TikTok affects far more than Universal recording artists and songwriters.
Every now and then, a music company pulls its recorded music catalog, publishing catalog or both from a digital service provider after licensing talks break down — Warner Music Group did this with YouTube in 2008, for example. It happened again starting Feb. 1 when UMG started pulling its recordings from TikTok after the two companies couldn’t come to an agreement on a new licensing deal.
The licensing breakdown first affected artists signed to UMG record labels. Take the Q4 Hot 100, a list of the top 100 tracks in the fourth quarter. UMG’s various record labels — including Republic Records and Interscope Records — released 41 of the 100 tracks, among them Taylor Swift’s “Cruel Summer,” Doja Cat’s “Paint the Town Red” and Brenda Lee’s “Rockin’ Around the Christmas Tree.”
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On Tuesday (Feb. 27), TikTok began removing compositions part-owned by Universal Music Publishing Group (UMPG). On the publishing side, UMG has an interest in 40 of the Q4 2023 Hot 100 tracks, such as SZA’s “Snooze” (a track released by Sony’s RCA Records), Jack Harlow’s “Lovin on Me” (a track released by Warner Music Group’s Atlantic Records) and Usher’s “Good Good” (a track released by gamma, an indie newcomer).
Since every recording involves two copyrights — one for the master recording, one for the composition — the damage of UMG’s decision to pull its repertoire from TikTok is larger yet. Counting both recorded music and music publishing, UMG has an ownership interest in 61 of the Q4 2023 Hot 100 tracks. Twenty of those 61 tracks have a UMG publishing interest but were not released by a UMG-owned record label. Another 20 of those tracks have a UMG publishing interest and were released by a UMG record label. UMG does not have a publishing interest in the remaining 21 of those tracks that were released by a UMG record label.
That’s far larger than UMG’s market share in either recorded music or publishing. UMG had a 39.4% share of U.S. recorded music by distribution in 2023 (a 29.4% share by ownership) and a 15.8% publisher’s market share of the Hot 100 in the fourth quarter of 2023.
Ownership interest, not market share, gets to the true impact of the UMG-TikTok impasse. Today’s popular songs have multiple co-writers, each of whom might have a different music publisher. When a track includes a sample or interpolation of another composition, those works’ songwriters get credits on the new work, too. The 41 tracks on the Hot 100 in which UMG has a publishing interest have an average of 5.5 songwriters. Eight of those 41 tracks had 8 or more co-writers; four of them had 10 or more co-writers. Of the 41 tracks with UMG ownership interest, only Irving Berlin’s 83-year-old “White Christmas” was written by one person.
The more songwriters who are on a single track, the higher the odds that any one music publisher can remove a track during a licensing dispute. An example of this complexity is “What It Is (Block Boy)” by Doechii featuring Kodak Black, released by UMG-owned Capitol Records (the track entered the Hot 100 in May thanks to success on TikTok). The recording includes a sample of TLC’s 1999 hit “No Scrubs” and interpolates a hook from “Some Cut” by Lil Scrappy and Trillville, which reached No. 15 on the Hot 100 in 2005. “What It Is (Block Boy)” has 16 co-writers, including the 4 co-writers of “No Scrubs” and 6 co-writers of “Some Cut.”
A wide swatch of the music publishing business is represented in “What It Is (Block Boy).” The Music Licensing Collective’s public database lists 7 different publishers attached to the composition: UMPG, Sony/ATV, Warner Chappell Music, Disney, BMG, Concord and Reservoir Media. UMPG’s 3% collection share is the smallest of the seven publishers.
To be sure, the Hot 100 from the fourth quarter of 2023 isn’t a perfect reflection of what is currently most popular — or would be popular if not for the licensing impasse — at TikTok. The TikTok Billboard 50 shows the platform’s most popular music is a mix of Hot 100 staples (“Lovin On Me”) and indie music that otherwise wouldn’t be seen on a Billboard chart (Aphex Twin’s “QKThr”).
This headline-grabbing development isn’t a story of one music company against one tech company; labels and publishers that renewed their licensing deals with TikTok have unwillingly joined UMG’s battle with the platform. UMG’s inability to reach a deal with TikTok impacts every major label group and likely touches every music publisher of note.
If 2023 was the year of Taylor Swift, 2024 could be the year of the superfan.
While Swift’s The Eras Tour proved that music fans are willing to spend large sums and travel far to see their favorite artist, for years promoters have improved their revenues by selling premium experiences to concerts and festivals. Whether it’s dynamically priced seats close to the stage, VIP access or a revamped cocktail offering, there are more options for fans willing to pay more to enjoy the sights, sounds and hospitality of live music. Expect an even greater emphasis on this in the new year.
The focus on superfans isn’t confined to live music. The CEOs of Universal Music Group and Warner Music Group both started the year by highlighting a desire to better serve superfans. In the recent past, that may have meant NFTs and newfangled web3 offerings. Today, superfans buy multiple copies of albums (both LP and CD) and merchandise, often directly from the artist’s web store. Streaming services could soon be getting into the game, too, by offering “superfan clubs,” Spotify CEO Daniel Ek suggested in a Jan. 24 open letter.
But live music has a unique ability to upcharge for premium experiences — and add to companies’ bottom lines in the process. Tickets for superstar acts have proven to have remarkably resistant to price increases. In 2023, the average price of a Taylor Swift concert ticket on Stubhub was nearly $1,100. Drake, Morgan Wallen and Beyonce prices averaged about $450, $390 and $324, respectively.
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Emphasis on superfans makes sense in an era of higher priced primary tickets that capture value that would otherwise go the secondary market. Artists are increasingly willing to charge more up front rather than lose money to re-sellers. Still, the typical secondary ticket is still almost twice the price of a primary ticket, Live Nation president and COO Joe Berchtold said during the company’s earnings call on Thursday. Currently, about 9% of Live Nation’s amphitheater business comes from premium offerings such as VIP boxes, added president and CEO Michael Rapino. He thinks that should be 30% to 35% instead. To get those numbers, Live Nation is upgrading the concert experience.
This year, Live Nation plans to spend $300 million of its $540 million of capital expenditures on revenue-generating projects. The top four projects — including Foro Sol in Mexico City and Northwell Health at Jones Beach on Long Island — will account for $150 million of the $300 million. The other half includes several projects in the tens of millions of dollars such as VIP clubs, viewing decks, rock boxes and new bar designs, said Berchtold. Those “tactical improvements,” as he called them, can produce a return on investment in the 40–50% range.
Putting more emphasis on revenue-generating enhancements will boost the bottom line in 2024. Following a stadium-heavy touring slate in 2023, Live Nation will put more tours in owned and operated amphitheaters and arenas that allow the company to capture fan spending on parking and hospitality. Stadium shows have higher average ticket prices, Rapino explained, but amphitheater and arena shows produce higher per-person spending. In other words, the venues are smaller but have better margins for the promoter. As a result, Live Nation expects higher adjusted operating income in the second and third quarters. “We’re going to have a fabulous year,” said Rapino.
Dynamic pricing — seats closer to the stage are priced far above seats further away — is just getting started outside of the United States and presents “a great growth opportunity” as it expands from Europe to South America and Australia, said Rapino. There’s room for growth in the United States, too, as dynamic pricing extends beyond the top artists and into amphitheaters and other concerts. “We still think that’s a multi-year opportunity to continue to grow our top line plus [our] bottom line,” he said.
The price-conscious fan isn’t forgotten as concerts increasingly cater to big spenders. Live Nation offers a lawn pass for amphitheaters called Lawnie Pass — the 2024 edition costs $239 each and offers lawn admission to multiple shows at select amphitheaters — and sold an unlimited pass for select clubs called Club Pass in 2022. And company executives have repeatedly stated that a benefit of dynamic pricing is that higher prices for in-demand seats allow for lower prices for seats further from the stage.
But from live music to music streaming, companies are searching for ways to beef up their margins. As such, expect the market to continue segmenting into higher-value and lower-value fans.
If rock and roll were dead, it would be bad news for the Marshall Group, the Swedish company that manufactures its namesake guitar amplifier. But the company behind the amp doesn’t think rock is anywhere close to expiring — and its most recent earnings result backs that up.
In fact, the Marshall Group doesn’t believe rock is confined to a music genre. “We think Marshall represents the rock and roll attitude,” says CEO Jeremy de Maillard. “We don’t think this is about the music genre, we think this is about attitude.”
Since last year, Marshall, which was founded in the United Kingdom, has been running out of a country better known for Spotify and pop music: Sweden. In 2023, Stockholm-based Zound Industries, a maker of headphones and wireless speakers, acquired Marshall Amplification and took the name The Marshall Group. The Marshall family retained a 24% stake in the company and family heirs Terry and Victoria Marshall each have a seat on the board of directors. Altor Funds came aboard in September as a minority investor.
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De Maillard calls it “a very complimentary acquisition” that retained “almost everyone” from both companies other than “a couple changes at the very top,” as the two companies’ management structures were integrated into one group. And Zound and Marshall had a history well before the acquisition: Zound had collaborated with Marshall for 14 years and put the Marshall brand on its headphones and speakers. “It’s kind of like we were dating, and now we’re married,” de Maillard adds.
The marriage appears to be off to a good start. Last year, the Marshall Group’s revenue increased 29% to 4 billion kroner ($380 million) and its adjusted operating profit improved 77% to 757 million kroner ($72 million), the company announced Thursday (Feb. 14). Pro-forma revenue — which includes Marshall Amplification and its subsidiaries for the full year — grew 18% year over year. Although the company is privately held, it releases select financial information to the public: “We believe that having the right rigor and financial reporting that is expected of a public company is good behavior and makes us a stronger company,” explains de Maillard.
A quarter of the Marshall Group’s sales come from headphones while 70% is derived from speakers and 5% come from amplifiers, according to de Maillard. The Marshall brand accounts for 98% of the Marshall Group’s revenue, with the remaining 2% coming from Urbanears and adidas headphones.
With the merger behind him, de Maillard’s plan is to invest in the Marshall brand and launch new products to increase its share of the $100 billion music technology market that currently stands at less than 1%. In the last six months, the Marshall Group has invested in Marshall’s U.K. manufacturing facility, which produces hand-made valve amps and houses a recording studio. This year, the Marshall Group will begin to offer its entire portfolio at a revamped Marshall website to build a stronger direct-to-consumer sales channel.
The company will continue to push its iconic hand-made valve amplifiers but will step up its strategy with its digital amplifiers and digital tools, says de Maillard. Digital amps have a variety of uses, he explains; the smaller amps are good for practicing and rehearsing in small spaces, for example, and don’t require the muscle or energy requirements of a larger valve amplifier. Last year, the Marshall Group launched the Studio JTM Amplifier and the Middleton, a portable speaker, while also debuting wireless noise-canceling headphones called the Motif II A.N.C. More products are set to launch in 2024, de Maillard says.
“It’s one of the most known and loved brands in that space that has over 60 years of incredible legacy,” says de Maillard. “We see our responsibility now as the Marshall Group to write the next chapter of that and to build the next 60 years.”
What’s the best way to become a superstar? First, become a successful mainstream artist.
That’s one of the key takeaways from the inaugural annual report from music data company Chartmetric.
Of the roughly 710,000 new artists added to Chartmetric’s platform in 2023 that placed into one of six career stages — ranging from “undiscovered” to “legendary,” only a small fraction of a percent finished the year amongst the top 35,000 artists. Instead, most new artists — 87.6% of them — fell into the “undiscovered” category, while 12.3% of them reached “developing,” one category above.
The upper echelons were incredibly difficult for new artists to reach. Just 0.05% of new artists — about 355 — finished in the mid-level category or higher — meaning they ranked in the top 35,000 on the platform. Chartmetric created its proprietary Career Stages categories by taking into account artists’ performance across streaming services, social media platforms and radio airplay.
But wait, the numbers are even more imposing! There were actually 1.3 million new artists added to Chartmetric in 2023, but only 710,000 of them were actually assigned a career stage. Chartmetric told Billboard it does not assign every artist a career stage to limit duplicates, remove non-artist profiles and filter out artists with limited data.
Chartmetric’s statistics throw cold water on the notion that social media and do-it-yourself distribution can help any artist reach the levels of success previously attainable only to artists on record labels. Those rare instances grab headlines and feed the narrative that technology has eroded traditional gatekeepers’ powers and democratized access to audiences. And while it’s true that artists such as Armani White and Jxdn rode TikTok fame to major-label record deals, those success stories are outliers. Anonymity, or something close to it, is the norm.
Economic mobility is far from impossible, though. Because Chartmetric tracks so many artists, even incredibly low odds of success can result in a meaningful number of artists moving up the ranks. The 355 new artists that broke into or surpassed the mid-tier level is a big enough number of breakthrough new artists to feed a system of record labels and artist-services companies that must constantly seek out young candidates to become future stars.
Still, the challenging math underpinning success in music makes sense. Getting heard is difficult when audiences live under a constant deluge of listening options. A massive amount of music is released every day — more than 110,000 on average every day in 2023, according to Luminate. Chartmetric added 17.2 million new tracks to its database in 2023 — 7.7 million were released last year — and has 103.9 million tracks in its system.
To evaluate career stage development, Chartmetric took a sample of artists who had reached a career stage on June 11. The vast majority of artists fell into the undiscovered category. In fact, undiscovered artists made up all but 150,000 of the roughly 1.5 million artists who had been given any career stage category on June 11.
Rather than take huge jumps in career stages, most artists who break out to superstar status come from the mainstream, not from the mid-level or developing categories. More than half — 54.2% — of mid-level artists (No. 12,000 to No. 35,000) rose to the mainstream category (No. 1,500 to No. 12,000), the strongest relationship between any two career stages, says Chartmetric.
Put another way, getting to the upper echelon usually means you’ve already had considerable success. This is likely to result of “a steady, consistent rise to the top,” Chartmetric opines, rather than overnight fame.
This path to success makes sense given the advantageous starting point of most major label artists. Rare is the artist plucked from obscurity and developed into a chart-topping success from scratch. In most cases, artists build a career independently and prove themselves — whether through a TikTok hit or ticket sales — before signing with a record label. The bidding war comes after, not before, an artist finds an audience. Undiscovered artists are far riskier propositions for record labels than mid-tier artists.
There is some economic mobility for less successful careers — but not much. About 12% of developing artists were able to rise to mid-level status (No. 12,000 to No. 35,000). Far fewer jumped all the way to the upper echelons: Just 0.25% of developing artists jumped mid-level status and reached mainstream (No. 1,500 to No. 12,000) or superstar (top 1,500).
Just as economic mobility characterizes the “American dream,” the idea that a person can strive to achieve a better life, the great hope of the modern music business is that artists can make a living on streaming royalties. Whether the system is fair is under debate. Spotify, Deezer and SoundCloud have changed their royalty calculations to favor professional and developing artists over undeveloped artists and non-music content. In the European Union, lawmakers are pressing music streaming services to improve payouts to artists.
Chartmetric’s report doesn’t dispel any notions that the odds are stacked against new artists hoping to break into the mainstream. Success is possible, but it’s rare.
At the beginning of 2024, the always-changing music business is going through rapid transformation unlike anything in the last decade. How music companies organize themselves is changing. How royalties are calculated and paid is changing. How companies engage with fans is changing. And investors have different expectations of public companies — more focus on margins, less obsession with growth.
Music companies’ earnings results for the fourth quarter of 2023 will provide insights into how companies have performed and, more importantly, what they expect to do in the future. Only one company, SiriusXM, has announced to date. Next week’s earnings releases include Spotify (Tuesday, Feb. 6), Reservoir Media (Wednesday, Feb. 7) and Warner Music Group (Thursday, Feb. 8). Universal Music Group (UMG) announces earnings on Feb. 28. Here are some things to watch for in upcoming earnings calls.
The scope of layoffs
In October, UMG executives primed investors for cost-cutting measures that would improve margins and allow for investments in growth opportunities. The result would be hundreds of layoffs, according to a Jan. 12 Bloomberg report. On Thursday, UMG revealed some details of a bi-coastal label group restructuring. But what’s missing, so far, are details on the number of layoffs and the cost savings UMG expects to get from a restructuring. UMG’s fourth-quarter earnings release on Feb. 28 will be an opportunity for analysts to ask the company to give an update on its restructuring plans. As Billboard noted last week, the music industry is seeing widespread layoffs despite continued streaming growth. Warner Music Group (WMG), Downtown Music Holdings and BMG cut jobs in 2023. Digital music companies have shrunk their head counts, too: Spotify, Amazon Music, SoundCloud, Tidal and Bandcamp went through downsizings of various sizes.
More troubles in TikTok-land?
When UMG failed to renew its licensing contract with TikTok, it made licensing to the social video platform a major topic of conversation for upcoming earnings calls. Analysts and investors should want to know how a company’s negotiations with TikTok are proceeding and whether to expect an interruption if the two sides cannot reach an agreement. TikTok and WMG reached an agreement in July 2023, but investors may want progress reports from other public companies — Reservoir Media, Believe, Sony Music — about their licensing talks.
UMG’s decision is not without precedent: In 2008 and 2009, WMG pulled its catalog from YouTube for nine months while the two companies’ licensing negotiations were at an impasse. In 2011, Google launched an audio music streaming service, Music Beta by Google, without licenses from both Sony Music Entertainment (SME) and WMG. When Google added MP3s to its Google Music service later that year, the SME and WMG catalogs were initially absent.
The direct financial hit to UMG will be minimal since TikTok accounts for 1% of the company’s revenue, UMG stated in an open letter about the licensing talks. But because TikTok is an important promotional vehicle and a popular place to discover music, the indirect financial hit is more substantial. Investors always want to know about direct dollar impacts of a company’s moves, and they should want to understand the downsides of leaving a hit-making social platform.
How much have price increases mattered?
Music subscription prices didn’t budge for over a decade before succumbing to change in 2022 and 2023. The big fish was Spotify, which finally raised prices in the United States and other major markets in July. A higher price creates a multiplier effect on top of existing subscriber growth and will augment what would have otherwise been record quarterly revenues. The gains should come without an increase in churn: Spotify CFO Paul Vogel said during an Oct. 27 earnings call that Spotify didn’t lose any subscribers in the third quarter due to the price increase.
For record labels and publishers, a 10% price increase atop year-over-year subscriber growth stands to accelerate revenue growth. Guggenheim analysts said in a recent note to investors that they expect price increases at Spotify, YouTube and Deezer to raise UMG’s subscription revenue growth to 14.8% in the fourth quarter from 13.0% in the third quarter.
The state of the advertising business
While the subscription market has been strong, the ad-supported side of the business has struggled to keep chase. Through the first three quarters, Spotify’s ad-supported streaming revenue increased 14.9% year over year. That’s better than the 11.4% improvement in subscription revenue but well below the 22.2% and 62.1% gains in ad revenue in full-year 2022 and 2021, respectively.
Broadcast radio has fared even worse. Companies such as iHeartMedia, Cumulus Media and Audacy have blamed a slowdown in national broadcast advertising on some disappointing earnings in recent quarters.
SiriusXM provided the latest clue about broadcast advertising. “SiriusXM’s advertising revenue remains challenged,” CFO Tom Barry said during Thursday’s earnings call, “which we believe is a product of a tough broadcast advertising market.” Elsewhere, however, SiriusXM’s digital advertising improved versus 2022: Pandora had “strong growth” in its podcasting and programmatic advertising businesses, added Barry.
Some positive news in recent days shows advertising — perhaps not for broadcast businesses — is rebounding. U.S. ad spending in November was up 25% year over year, according to MediaRadar, an advertising intelligence company. The number of advertisers declined 8%, however, suggesting existing advertisers were ramping up spending.
More good news came from major ad-driven tech companies. Google’s advertising revenue in the fourth quarter increased 11% from the prior-year period, the company announced Wednesday, up from year-over-year improvements of 3.3% and 9.5% in the second and third quarters, respectively. Meta’s revenue grew 25% and its ad impressions rose 28% in the fourth quarter, the company announced Thursday.
The mission to reach superfans
Major music companies are suddenly taking a greater interest in serving superfans, those heavy-spending consumers that drive the concert and merchandise businesses but have less effect in a world of flat-rate, all-you-can-eat music subscription services. The 80-20 rule says 80% of a company’s business comes from 20% of its consumers. With music streaming, however, a $10.99-per-month service doesn’t capture a superfan’s willingness to pay more for additional value. Spotify hinted that “superfan clubs” were in the works in an announcement about the Digital Markets Act in the European Union. UMG CEO Lucian Grainge’s letter to staff in January said the company will focus on “strengthening the artist-fan relationship through superfan experiences and products.”
The problem isn’t that consumers won’t pay more money to engage with their favorite artists. The problem is no platforms have found a winning formula. Numerous previous attempts to court superfans fizzled. Drip, a platform that allowed artists to provide fans with music and other items for a recurring monthly fee, lasted from 2011 to 2016 (it relaunched a Kickstarter in 2017 but shut down in 2018). PledgeMusic shut down in 2019 amidst financial problems and allegations of improprieties. Most recently, startups’ attempts to use Web3 technologies to build superfan communities ran headfirst into the public’s sudden distrust of cryptocurrency and disinterest in NFTs. Given Spotify’s market size and resources, though, the company could make a real impact.
