beatdapp
Andrew Batey is best known to the music industry as the founder of streaming fraud prevention company Beatdapp. But for the last six years, Batey has been simultaneously building up a venture capital firm called Side Door Ventures. “I always wanted to just be viewed as a founder, but Beatdapp is probably my last company,” says Batey, a serial entrepreneur, who has also built companies in the restaurant and digital marketing industries. “I started thinking about where I want to transition to eventually, and I believe it’s investing.”
For the last 15 years, Batey says he’s mentored hundreds of companies at different accelerators, which is where he got the itch to start stepping into the investor role. After years of angel investing to check his aptitude, he realized, “I feel like I’m really good at picking the right companies.”
Side Door quietly launched in 2018 and comprises 14 different smaller funds covering a wide array of disciplines — space travel, blockchain, manufacturing and more. Investors are also interested in music and entertainment, too, though Batey says it needs to be something he believes he can grow “by 100x” and “there are not that many” entertainment startups that fit that bill. To date, he’s made investments in companies like SpaceX, Pipe, Plaid, Varda and EtherFi, as well as music-related startups like JKBX and the now-defunct superfans app Renaissance, which he felt particularly passionate about.
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In total, Batey says Side Door has averaged 61% gross internal rate of return across all funds since its launch and has over 100 companies in its portfolio.
Now that Beatdapp has established itself as an industry leader with partnerships with Universal Music Group, the Mechanical Licensing Collective, Beatport, SoundExchange and more, Batey is ready to talk about Side Door Ventures for the first time.
Why are you making your press debut, six years into Side Door Ventures?
To talk about it too early seemed like a giant, “Look at me! Look at me!” And that’s not really what a founder needs — a founder needs help. I’ve always just felt comfortable being the neck that moves the head, but I’ve lost my ability to be stealthily leading this, the more checks we’ve written.
In the beginning, a lot of startups just thought I was a founder. As soon as we had that founder-to-founder rapport, the person would just start sharing all these things that he wouldn’t have shared with an investor. But none of them were deal breakers. I found the transparency actually really great. There was a strength in meeting a founder at their level, without them knowing you’re the investor.
I named the fund Side Door Ventures because they never saw it coming when I would meet with the founder. They just thought I was mentoring them, and then I would suddenly be like, “I’d like to write a half million dollar check.”
It really favored us well because I wasn’t convincing them why they needed our money. I gave them advice and mentorship first, and then told them I wanted to write the check and that’s the exact thing they want. Many want someone that’s going to be helpful, and not someone just writing a check. In really tight funding rounds where people get pushed out, we often got into them early on when we should never have been.
But the cat’s out of the bag, and I’m ready to just own it.
What makes Side Door Ventures different from others in the field?
Fundamentally, the way we’ve been billed as a fund is entirely different than everyone else. We intentionally started with small funds that are $10 million to $30 million each. We have 14 funds overall.
When I started the fund, I had a big family that offered to give me $100 million to get started, and they wanted to know what my strategy would be. I always felt that big funds are really hard to return. So my strategy was, Why don’t we make a bunch of smaller funds of higher return multiples that traditionally perform better?
When I started talking to fund managers, though, they thought it was crazy. They’re like, “Institutions won’t bankroll that — a pension fund wants to have a check size of at least $10 million.” If you’re building a fund to please people covering their ass, you’re not building a fund for optimal returns. And if I was building a fund for optimizing returns, and if this was my money, I would go the opposite way and make a bunch of small funds. So my customer investor is totally different than most. My customers are high net worth individuals and families who care more about the returns, and less about whether I check a box.
For every small fund we have a slightly different iteration. We have one with the state of Michigan which is just focusing on manufacturing, advanced materials and mobility — things that the state of Michigan has talent resources for. We have a web3 fund which focuses on blockchain. We have a seed fund which is focused on seed investing. We have a European fund focused on European college students, specifically. I don’t know any other funds doing it like this.
Most Billboard readers know you as the founder of Beatdapp. Given that background, do you have interest in investing in companies that are complementary to what Beatdapp does?
Because of Beatdapp, I have views on where the industry could still use a lot of help, and I probably have some unique data insights about where there’s juice to squeeze. But I view Side Door and Beatdapp as entirely separate. We don’t have any of the same investors, so I don’t take money in one entity and then bring it to the other. It’s a fully firewall situation where we have different investors, different teams, different everything.
If there is anything that I’m too privy to because of my work outside of Side Door — let’s say that I have a relationship with founders of a company — I generally sit out of the investment committee and let the rest of the committee decide so that there’s no bias going into the decision making.
I love music and entertainment. It’s a big part of my background, so I obviously want to invest in things that are in that sector. But the majority of all music companies exit for under $15 million. The reality is that music is not the best venture-backable investment, which means that there are very few companies that meet the sort of the requirements to warrant a venture capital investment from us.
We have a bunch of funds, but they’re all basically investing in things we think could [provide] 100x [returns]. So if you’re a music startup valued at $20 million, how many companies have exited that are over $2 billion? The answer is probably only a handful — like Spotify.
That means one of two things. I either have to catch you way earlier, like in your first round, or you need to be such an outlier that I believe the market will move in your direction. For example, we invested in JKBX. Why? If you think about JKBX as a trading entity and the fact that it’s more of a fintech play than it is a music play, you could see a platform getting traction. Now, will they make it or not? Only time will tell. But they have the profile to potentially be worth billions of dollars if they can build that habit formation and become another asset type.
You have mentioned before that you learned a lot from investing in a superfan company, Renaissance, which ultimately went bust. Monetizing the superfan is such a hot topic in the music business right now. What did that experience teach you about the viability of superfan-related startups?
We see 7,000-8,000 deals a year, and I cannot think of another case where I saw a consumer-facing application that was as sticky with their fans as Renaissance. They had a million downloads — all organic, no marketing. They had 47% day-90 retention, meaning 47% of all users stuck with it after 90 days, which is insanely good. I think the average user launched the app 21 times per day — that’s like Instagram level.
The problem is that I don’t think they knew how to fully monetize it. Artists didn’t want to pay for it, labels didn’t want to pay for it. There wasn’t a big enough venture-backable business there. It was more of a $10 million to $15 million business, but how do you make that a $100 million business? They were struggling to figure out what could be scaled.
If this company who had the viral, organic growth and absolutely crushed it couldn’t figure out how to get those customers to pay, and couldn’t figure out how to get artists to pay, and couldn’t figure out how to get labels to pay, then how are any of these other fan apps going to make money?
The only way I think you can build a successful “superfan” business is by owning the merch pipeline itself — basically, you need to be the one that’s vertically integrated. You need to be integrating and selling the actual goods yourself so that you can build enough margins in there to support the business. If you were just a third party marketplace for all these other goods and services — like posters and tickets and merch — I don’t think there’s enough money there. I don’t believe that’s scalable.
This summer, the major labels filed a lawsuit against two AI music startups, Suno and Udio, and in early September, it was revealed that the use of AI music was instrumental in the scam alleged in the $10 million streaming fraud lawsuit. Do you see this affecting people’s confidence in AI music startups?
It could affect consumer confidence, but I do not think it will dissuade investors. The reality is, investors aren’t afraid of breaking things. Where a lot of people are mad because the status quo is changing, a lot of investors see that as a positive — as they say, “Volatility breeds profitability.”
However, what will succeed here is whoever comes up with a business model where everyone wins and it’s convenient for consumers, and they enjoy the experience. I haven’t seen one that wins yet. I haven’t seen a business model where consumers actually like it.
Look at the Drake–Weeknd guy [anonymous TikTok user Ghostwriter and his song “Heart On My Sleeve,” which used AI to deepfake Drake and the Weeknd]. His song was listened to millions of times, but it also had a pretty equal number of listeners. What that means is people were only listening to it one time or so and then leaving. It was a novelty. It wasn’t something that people saw longterm value in. Until there’s a product that people see longterm value, it’s not going to work.
The Mechanical Licensing Collective (The MLC) has partnered with Beatdapp, an independent fraud detection company, to prevent streaming fraud. While the MLC already has internal measures in place to fight against this, their collaboration with Beatdapp will provide additional and complementary protections to their database.
Beatdapp has quickly become the music industry’s go-to for independent fraud analysis in the last few years. The company has worked for a number of record labels, collection societies, distributors and streaming services to help them sift through trillions of lines of data and identify and investigate suspicious patterns. At the beginning of this year, Beatdapp announced a strategic partnership with Universal Music Group and a fundraise of $17 million in its latest funding round. Other clients include SoundCloud, Beatport, 7digital and more.
According to a report from Centre National de la Musique (CNM), a government-backed organization that supports France’s music industry, in 2021, over 1 billion music streams — between 1% and 3% of all streams generated in the country that year — were fraudulent. Streaming fraud can take on a number of forms. This can include falsely claiming royalties and ownership of songs made by other artists, or uploading songs and juicing their stream count using various means, like bot farms or account hacking.
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Billboard has investigated the rise and persistence of royalties fraud, including one story detailing an outfit out of Arizona, called Mediamuv, which stole $23 million in YouTube royalties over the course of 5 years. “The methods used by fraudsters are constantly evolving and improving,” as the CNM report states.
“The MLC is uniquely positioned within the music industry to contribute significantly to addressing streaming fraud,” says Andrew Mitchell, chief analytics and automation officer at The MLC. “Building on our ongoing efforts, we are proud to be working with Beatdapp to further amplify the many ways The MLC serves its 43,000+ Members.”
“The MLC plays a vital role in the music industry and we’re proud to collaborate with them and enhance their continuous efforts to combat streaming fraud,” says Morgan Hayduk and Andrew Batey, co-CEOs at Beatdapp. “Beatdapp has built its technology by learning from the best trust and safety solutions serving other online verticals and tailoring our technology to the unique attributes of music, to provide an unbiased, independent fraud detection solution capable of grappling with the persistent and ever-changing nature of fraud.”
Beatdapp co-founders and co-CEOs Morgan Hayduk and Andrew Batey were not initially focused on fighting streaming manipulation. Batey spent years in digital marketing, while Hayduk formerly worked as a lobbyist for the Canadian music industry in the area of copyright protection. At first, they teamed to build an auditing tool that would enable labels to evaluate inconsistencies between their sales reports and streaming services’ server logs. Conversations with label executives indicated that “there were pretty often material discrepancies,” Hayduk says.
As he and Batey tried to understand those inconsistencies, it became clear that streaming manipulation was causing some of them, and Beatdapp embarked on developing a tool to detect fraudulent streams — which Hayduk defines as the leveraging of “bots, stolen accounts or manipulated platform features” to steal streaming income — and prevent them from impacting payouts.
According to a recent report from the Centre National de la Musique (CNM), a government-backed organization that supports France’s music industry, in 2021, over 1 billion music streams — between 1% and 3% of all streams generated in the country that year — were fraudulent. “The methods used by fraudsters are constantly evolving and improving,” the report noted, “and fraud seems to be getting easier and easier to commit.” If that percentage was applied to IFPI’s estimate that global streaming revenue totaled $17.5 billion in 2022, fraudulent streams would amount to $350 million in potential lost income for legitimate rights holders.
Beatdapp’s software sifts through massive amounts of data from partners — including labels, distributors and streaming services — to identify and investigate suspicious patterns. In one case, it identified 10,000 accounts all playing the same 63 tracks. The pair say the company now analyzes hundreds of billions of streams, and while they declined to identify partners, they recently started working with SoundCloud and Napster, according to two sources.
“If we can make this industry less attractive for financial fraudsters, that will make a positive difference for everybody who’s working on music,” Hayduk says. “That’s what animates us.”
Why is streaming fraud an important issue?
MORGAN HAYDUK: It hurts everyone who makes a living in the music industry and, left unchecked, creates this promotional race to the bottom where everyone believes they have to cheat to succeed. In cybersecurity terms, it’s important to shrink the attack surface of the industry.
ANDREW BATEY: In an industry where it’s already hard to make something and then promote something and then get paid, you should at least get paid correctly.
How much data is Beatdapp analyzing at this point?
HAYDUK: We’re looking at about 320 billion streams now. That’s about 13 trillion individualized streaming data points when you account for all of the metadata associated with each of those streams. We expect to add data in the neighborhood of another 50 billion streams in [the second quarter] and about another 2 trillion data points on that.
BATEY: It’s not just the individual stream. You might make 12 decisions in an app, such as how you search — if you clicked on the artist first and then you looked at their song list. We’re capturing all of that, anonymized across users. All of that context helps us because if somebody consistently hits, let’s say, the exact 11 things for every song they play, that’s a pretty obvious case of fraud if they’ve done that 3,000 times in a week.
How has the industry’s perception of streaming fraud changed since you started Beatdapp?
HAYDUK: Just hearing people acknowledge the issue is probably the biggest shift. It used to be verboten to speak publicly about streaming fraud. It was all behind closed doors. But I don’t think you can fix a problem until you accept its existence. We’re starting to get there now and [are] seeing a more widespread willingness to put in place solutions.
How has your perception of the problem changed as your data set has expanded?
HAYDUK: The biggest revelation to us has to be that this is way closer to death by a thousand paper cuts than it is a top-of-the-market problem. If you asked us where most of the fraud came from 18 months ago, we probably would have pointed the finger at bigger artists because we would have thought they had the most to gain. But we were missing the point of most of this activity. It’s not about changing perception; it’s about making money. This isn’t a phenomenon that’s driven by major labels and major independent label artists or their top artists. The overwhelming majority, like upwards of 80% of what we see is fraud, is coming from — call it non-music content. It’s not being released for popular consumption or because these are artists who are trying to get noticed. These are releases that have no commercial purpose except as [instruments of] fraud.
BATEY: When we first started, we genuinely thought fraud would be 1% to 3%. Now we think it’s closer to 10% [though some of this is caught]. Also we would have guessed that most of the fraud would occur on the platforms where people were — Spotify, Apple, YouTube. But because it’s a lot of financially motivated fraud, what we actually see is that it’s easier for the fraudsters to attack all the mid- and long-tail [digital service providers] as well, where they’re less likely to get caught and they’ll get a similar or better per-stream payout. Why not target all of these smaller DSPs with zero protections in place and get paid across all of them?
France’s CNM recently came to the conclusion that fraud is getting easier to commit.
BATEY: I 100% agree with that. There are so many ways to exploit platforms. If your job is to deliver the best user experience possible, it often means making it easy for them to access that content and creating really cool ways for them to experience or engage with that content. [When that happens,] there are more ways to manipulate that content for the purpose of exploiting it for a payout.
HAYDUK: And the tools that you need to commit fraud effectively and at scale are easier to access now than ever before. The tools that facilitate fraud in e-commerce or ticketing or financial services are also repackaged and repurposed to commit streaming fraud. You can generate fully automated online bot farms using cloud computing in a way you couldn’t 10 years ago.
How do you avoid generating false positives when you’re hunting for fraud?
HAYDUK: We know that a false positive is worth considerably more in the loss column than a false negative, so we adjust our models to account for the fact that they need to be conservative in the right ways.
BATEY: You can’t get it wrong. If you miss a fraudster, it’s OK. We hope we catch them later. If we call something fraud that’s not, that’s way worse.
Some have suggested that a user-centric payout system might mitigate fraud.
HAYDUK: Our view is that it’s not going to make that big a difference. It’ll change the tactics, but it won’t change the motivation. It’s a big pot of money on the internet, and generally speaking, the DSPs are still fairly soft targets. A different payout structure will just change the tactics that fraudsters use to aggregate money and divert it their way. Obviously, there’s a whole different case for the merits of payout systems if you’re an artist or you’re a label.
There’s a lot of industry concern about artificial intelligence right now. To what extent does AI make it even easier to commit these types of fraudulent activities?
HAYDUK: It’s a tool. We work for some good AI companies that care about not being a tool for fraudsters. That said, the new models are incredibly powerful, and you can create content at scale. There’s no putting the genie back in the bottle when some of these tools emerge. The tougher we make it to get away with fraud, the less valuable the tool becomes in the hands of someone who’s wielding it for a bad purpose.
How incentivized are DSPs to care about fraud?
HAYDUK: Their biggest partners care, especially in light of what we said earlier: Market share shifts matter to the partners and, therefore, it matters to the DSPs. I think consumers also care because bad recommendations on the DSP side make for bad user experience. And given that every platform is offering roughly the same catalog to the consumer, if your recommendations are substandard, that makes consumers more inclined to choose your competitor.
Some music industry executives worry that public discussions of fraud undermine user confidence.
HAYDUK: How many times a week does your bank email you about the extra efforts they’re taking to protect you from fraud in the financial sector? It doesn’t make me want to boycott my bank when they tell me that. Fans probably want to hear that, as an industry, we’re taking steps so that the artists they care about are paid correctly.
BATEY: If you’re the consumer, your account was hijacked, and now you’re getting a bunch of recommended songs that don’t make any sense, you’re not blaming the fraudster — you’re blaming the platform.
What is your dream scenario for fraud mitigation in the industry?
HAYDUK: Our view is there are some things you can’t do in a vacuum. DSP A can’t look at the data from DSP B to help inform its own detection models. It’s way too competitive between the platforms to give up the level of data required to do fraud detection at the highest levels. Having a platform in the middle acting as Switzerland, working for the collective benefit of everyone without minimizing the level of competitiveness between the platforms, is the right approach. And it’s also an approach that we’ve seen play out in other verticals with similar dynamics.
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