Manchester Arena
New legislation to protect concert goers from terror attacks at U.K. music venues has been presented in Parliament, following years of campaigning by the mother of Martyn Hett, one of the 22 victims of 2017’s Manchester Arena bombing outside an Ariana Grande concert.
The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, better known as Martyn’s Law, received its first reading in Parliament on Thursday (Sept. 12).
The legislation requires all venues with a capacity of more than 200 to take “appropriate action” to protect concert-goers from harm by having a number of measures in place, including mandatory safety training for staff and plans in place to prevent and protect against terror attacks.
For venues with capacities of more than 800 people, operators are required to draw up comprehensive public protection procedures that set out plans for evacuating people from the premises and moving them to a place where there is a reduced risk of physical harm.
These procedures will need to be regularly updated and assessed by U.K. regulator the Security Industry Authority (SIA), the law states. Large venues will also need to take appropriate steps to reduce their vulnerability to terror attacks by having CCTV monitoring the building and the immediate vicinity, or the hiring of security staff.
In addition, venue operators will be legally required to limit the disclosure of information about their premises that may be “useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.”
Failure to comply with the regulations or a venue providing false information to the SIA can result in fines of up to £18 million ($23.5 million) or 5% of the operator’s annual global revenue, whichever is greater. The maximum fine for a small music venue that holds between 200 and 800 people is capped at £10,000 ($13,000).
The government says the bill’s proportionate and tiered approach, which is linked to the size of the venue and scale of the activity taking place, will ensure that “undue burdens are not placed on small businesses.”
An impact assessment carried out by the Home Office estimates the cost of implementing the new security requirements to be around £300 ($390) per year for small venues and around £5,000 ($6,500) per year for buildings with a capacity of more than 800.
The long-proposed bill was drawn up in response to the suicide bomb attack outside an Ariana Grande concert at Manchester Arena in 2017 in which 22 people died and more than 800 people were injured, many of them children.
A public inquiry into the tragedy found that failings by the British security service MI5, local emergency services, Greater Manchester Police and security teams working at the SMG-operated venue meant that multiple opportunities to prevent or minimize the “devastating impact of the attack” were missed.
Figen Murray, the mother of victim Martyn Hett, has led the campaign for tougher security regulations to be put in place for music venues. Earlier this year, she walked 200 miles from Manchester to Downing Street, London, to push for the law to come into force.
“Today means we are one step closer to making public spaces safer for everyone,” Murray said in a statement.
Now that the bill has had its first reading in the House of Commons, it will be debated by MPs, who may propose amendments. It will then proceed to the House of Lords for approval before receiving Royal Ascent and becoming law. The government said that businesses will be given detailed guidance to understand their new obligations and time to implement any changes required.
“This legislation will strengthen public safety, help protect staff and the public from terrorism and ensure we learn the lessons from the terrible Manchester Arena attack and the inquiry that followed,” said the Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, in a statement.
Responding to the bill’s progress, Michael Kill, CEO of the Night Time Industries Association, praised Figen Murray for her “unwavering dedication” in honor of her son, but said it was crucial that the “balance between heightened security and practical implementation” is carefully considered by MPs.
“Key concerns include the operational impact, skillset required of venue operators and the financial implications of enforcing these new safety protocols,” Kill said. “While the objectives of Martyn’s Law are commendable, it is essential that the legislation is designed with feasibility and fairness in mind.”
LONDON — Security services could have prevented a suicide bomber from killing 22 people in a terror attack outside an Ariana Grande concert at Manchester Arena in 2017 if they had acted swiftly on key intelligence, a public inquiry has found.
The chair of the inquiry, John Saunders, says there was a “realistic possibility” that the bomber could have been stopped from carrying out the atrocity if British security service MI5 had acted decisively upon on two pieces of intelligence that they received in the months leading up to the attack. The significance of that intelligence, Saunders notes, “was not fully appreciated at the time.”
A 207-page report, published Thursday (March 2), details the radicalization of bomber Salman Abedi but does not disclose details of either piece of intelligence, citing national security reasons. It does, however, state that neither piece of intelligence was shared by MI5 with counter-terror police — a failing that Saunders calls “a further example of a communication breakdown” between security agencies.
The inquiry found that an MI5 officer, identified as Witness C, failed to write a report on the second piece of intelligence on the same day MI5 assessed it and did not discuss it with colleagues. That delay “led to the missing of an opportunity to take a potentially important investigative action.”
Abedi flew from Libya to Manchester on May 18 — four days before he detonated a homemade explosive device in the foyer of Manchester Arena (now known as the AO Arena) at the end of Grande’s sold-out show. Twenty-two people died in the terror attack, the youngest aged 8 years old. Hundreds of people were injured, many of them children.
The report contends that had MI5 taken the intelligence more seriously Abedi could have been stopped at Manchester Airport upon his return from Libya and followed to his car where he had stored his explosives.
In a press conference in Manchester on Thursday, Saunders said the “failure by the security service to act swiftly enough” had contributed to a “significant missed opportunity to take action that might have prevented the attack.”
The inquiry chair went on to say that while “it is not possible to reach any conclusion on the balance of probability” as to whether the bombing would have been prevented, he believed “there was a realistic possibility that actionable intelligence could have been obtained which might have led to actions preventing the attack.”
The report also found that Abedi’s family held “significant responsibility” for the radicalization of both him and his brother, Hashem Abedi, who was sentenced in the U.K. in 2020 to a minimum of 55 years for his role in the murders.
Thursday’s report is the third and final set of findings to come out of the public inquiry into the terror attack. The U.K. Home Secretary launched the inquiry in October 2019 with its first hearings taking place in Manchester in September 2020. In total, more than 250 witnesses gave 194 days of oral evidence, although much of the evidence from MI5 and counter-terror police officers was heard in secret.
The inquiry’s two previous reports have focused on how emergency services responded to the attack and whether police and concert security should have done more to prevent the bombing.
Families of the victims called the failures exposed in Thursday’s report “unacceptable” and a “devastating conclusion” to the inquiry. “Those killed and injured in this murderous attack had every right to feel safe and protected, but as this inquiry has demonstrated, they were failed at every level — before, during and after this horrific attack,” said Richard Scorer, principal lawyer at Slater and Gordon, reading out a statement on behalf of 11 of the victims’ families.
Andrew Roussos, the father of 8-year-old Saffie-Rose Roussos, who was one of the 22 victims, said the security services’ actions amounted to a “cataclysmic failure.”
“The fact that MI5 failed to stop [Salman Abedi] despite all of the red flags available demonstrates they are not fit to keep us safe and therefore not fit for purpose,” said Roussos.
Following the report’s publication, MI5’s director general, Ken McCallum, said he was “profoundly sorry” that the security service did not prevent the attack. “Gathering covert intelligence is difficult,” McCallum said in a statement, “but had we managed to seize the slim chance we had, those impacted might not have experienced such appalling loss and trauma.”
LONDON — One of the 22 people killed in a suicide bomb attack outside an Ariana Grande concert at Manchester Arena in 2017 would probably have survived had it not been for “significant failures” by the emergency services responding to the atrocity, a public inquiry has found.
John Atkinson, 28, died on May 22, 2017, when bomber Salman Abedi detonated a home-made explosive device in the foyer of Manchester Arena (now known as the AO Arena) at the end of a Grande’s sold-out show. More than 800 people were injured in the terror attack, many of them children.
An 884-page report detailing the emergency services response to the attack, published on Tuesday (Nov. 3), found that Atkinson, a caregiver for adults with autism, could have survived the attack “if given prompt and expert medical treatment.”
Instead, Atkinson, who was standing only six meters (nearly 20 feet) away from the bomber when he detonated his device at 10:31pm U.K. time, suffered severe injuries to his legs. He had to wait 47 minutes before he was treated by paramedics and then went into cardiac arrest and died on the way to the hospital.
“It is likely that inadequacies in the emergency response prevented his survival,” the report concluded.
The report is the second of three being produced by the public inquiry from the U.K. Home Secretary, which began in 2019.
The chair of the inquiry, John Saunders, said many things went “badly wrong” in how the emergency services responded to the attack, including “significant failings by a number of organizations in preparation and training” for such an emergency. On the night of the bombing, the national terror threat level in the U.K. was severe, meaning an attack was highly likely.
While praising the heroism of the first responders and citizens on the scene, Saunders identified “very significant” failures by Greater Manchester Police and an “unduly risk-averse” approach from the fire service. He also cited substantial problems with how the North West Ambulance Service handled the emergency, as well as serious failings by British Transport Police.
“Some of what went wrong had serious and, in the case of John Atkinson, fatal consequences for those directly affected by the explosion,” said Saunders. He concluded that none of the other 20 victims could have survived their injuries from the explosion and “inadequacies in the [emergency service] response did not fail to prevent their deaths.”
The report is highly critical of Greater Manchester Police for failing to declare a major incident in the immediate aftermath of the explosion. Two of the department’s most senior officers were on duty that night but made “no effective contribution to the emergency response.”
There was “non-existent” communication between emergency service senior offices and “individual failures” that further undermined the joint response, the report stated.
Only three paramedics entered the arena’s foyer to help the injured following the explosion. Fire officers took more than two hours to arrive at the scene after senior officers wrongly believed they were attending a marauding terror attack and it was not safe to send in firefighters – a delay that Saunders said was “serious and unacceptable.” Their presence would have resulted “in the safer and faster extraction of the severely injured” to another location where they could receive proper clinical care, he said.
The inquiry also found that there was a “remote possibility” that eight-year-old Saffie‐Rose Roussos — the youngest victim of the attack — could have been saved “with different treatment and care.” Roussos drifted in and out of consciousness for 26 minutes after the bomb blast and was able to give her name to the first member of the public who helped her, but no tourniquets or leg splints were applied to her injuries.
She was subsequently carried out of the foyer and taken to a hospital, where trauma doctors were unable to save her.
Following the report’s publication, David Russel, chief fire officer for Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, apologized for what he called a “wholly inadequate and totally ineffective” response that “will forever be a matter of deep regret.”
In all, the report makes 149 recommendations, including requiring first aid training for all police officers and firefighters and more regulation and enforcement to improve the standard of healthcare services at public venues.
The public inquiry’s first report into the terror attack, published last June, looked at whether police and security should have done more to prevent the bombing. It found that arena operators SMG, security company Showsec and the British Transport Police, who were responsible for policing the area where the bomb exploded, were “principally responsible” for missed opportunities to prevent or minimize the “devastating impact of the attack.”
The third and final report will focus on the radicalization of Salman Abedi and what intelligence services knew about him and his family. The bomber’s brother Hashem Abedi was sentenced in 2020 to a minimum of 55 years for his part in the bombing.
“Nothing will ease the pain of the families of those killed during the cowardly terrorist attack at Manchester Arena,” U.K. prime minister Rishi Sunak said on Twitter on Tuesday after the report’s release. “It is my solemn commitment to the victims, survivors and their loved ones that we will learn from the lessons of this inquiry.”
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